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Mobilising the dispositive: exploring the role of dockless public bike sharing in 
transforming urban governance in Shanghai 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to debates on urban governance and mobility through a case study of 
the transformation of public bike sharing schemes in Shanghai (China) from fixed/ docked 
(PBSS 1.0) to flexible/ dockless (PBSS 2.0). Based upon stakeholder interviews and 
observations between 2015 and 2017, we use the concept of dispositive to foreground two 
related processes. The first is the reformulation of the governmental dispositive that coalesces 
around PBSS in Shanghai. We show how the relations within the dispositive shift from more 
hierarchical, bounded, regulated and state-led to one those characterised by a more dispersed, 
disconnected, horizontal and distant set of social relations. Secondly, we show how this 
dispositive both produces and is produced by an emergent environmentality (Gabrys 2014) that 
manifests in a fixed territorially in PBSS1.0 and a more fluid and deterritorialised digital 
environmentality in PBSS2.0. In framing this shift, we demonstrate how PBSS 2.0 produces a 
new dispositive of urban governmentality where the conduct of users is dispersed through a 
much less co-ordinated network of actors and technologies. Ultimately we argue that it is no 
longer possible to separate physical and virtual mobility when trying to understand the internal 
dynamics and external manifestations of mobility governance, which in our example are 
characterized by by less localized and less hierarchical relationships that are more fluid, 
voluntary, less localised, flatter, and and physically distant .relationships.  
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1. Introduction     
Amongst initiatives designed to increase the mode share of urban utility cycling, public bike 
 
 
sharing schemes (PBSS) have increasingly been employed to pursue the concept of green 
mobility. A more recent wave of enthusiasm for their use in large cities was kick-started around 
2007 with the introduction of the Velib system in Paris (Shaheen et al 2010). A decade later 
DeMaio and Meddin’s (2017) ‘Bike Sharing World Map’ identified 1328 PBSS Schemes 
worldwide in operation (July 2017) with a further 405 planned or under construction. 
Following this trend, the promotion of urban cycling – and PBSS in particular – has been 
pursued vociferously in Chinese cities (Mason et al 2015) as a crucial policy tool in the new 
paradigm of modernization; clearly representing a break from a previous emphasis on 
motorised transportation and infrastructure identified as the cause of a variety of ‘urban 
illnesses’, most notably traffic congestion and environmental pollution. Exemplifying this 
trend, between 2009-2016, Shanghai (as the most westernized Chinese metropolis) 
implemented a docked/fixed system of PBSS 1.0 in 9 districts, or street offices (such as 
Minhang district), with 80000 public bikes at the peak of operation. Prior to the 
dockless/flexible PBSS2.0 boom of 2016, this symbolized a resurgence of green mobility in 
Shanghai. 
 
Beginning in spring 2015, a new form of dockless/ flexible bike sharing financed and managed 
by private operators, and hailed using a mobile phone app was rolled out in Shanghai. We use 
the term PBSS 2.0 in this paper to distinguish these systems from the older generation of PBSS 
1.0 which do not utilize ICTs to enable user access and required physical docking stations. The 
growth of PBSS 2.0 schemes in the cityShanghai has been nothing if not meteoric. By February 
2017 there were 260,000 public bikes, rising to 630,000 bikes by April 2017 with 7.5 million 
registered users and at least 10 different operators. By August 2017 there were 1.5 million 
public bikes in the city –  a staggering 16 per resident – with two Chinese firms Mobike & 
Ofo dominating the market alongside many smaller firms, the vast majority of which had 
disappeared by mid 2018 due to intense competition. The success and unlimited expansion of 
 
 
market-led PBSS 2.0 also rapidly marginalized and replaced PBSS 1.0 with the smartphonized 
and privatized PBSS 2.0 seen as a contingent and market-led solution to the failures of the 
previous system. Here we demonstrate how this new form of mobility is both produced by and 
generative of new forms of dynamic and contingent urban governance, practice and subjects 
(De Souza E Silva 2006). 
 
To-date the competing processes and transformation of governance between 
PBSS 1.0 and PBSS 2.0 have seen little if any empirical and critical exploration. A number of 
studies have focused on the economic, environmental and health benefits of PBSS (Caulfield 
et al, 2017; Lin et al, 2011, 2013; Shen et al, 2018; Lu, 2016). However, the bulk of PBSS 
research has focused on operational issues, with substantial research on parking (Lin & Yang, 
2011; Midgley, 2011; Paul & Bogenberger 2014); maintenance (Furth et al 2016); location (Shi 
et al 2018; Zhang & Mi, 2018); and redistribution of bicycles (Schuijbroek et al 2017). Whilst 
insightful, this is a largely instrumental literature geared towards convincing policy-makers of 
the benefits of PBSS and giving best practice advice on how to implement and maintain 
systems to maximize efficiency and profit.  
 
A small number of studies have tackled issues of governance in PBSS. Fishman et al. (2014) 
have explored the role of the state in the regulation of shared bicycles, showing that it has at 
best been loosely strategized. Guo et al. (2014) highlight the additional problems that PBSS 
brings to government with requirements for new legislation, industry supervision and 
infrastructure support. Echoing this, Yoon et al (2012) point to the time-lag between the 
appearance of PBSS as a new urban innovation and any corresponding governance and 
management structures. Huré & Passalacqua (2017) argue that new "government-market-
society" forms of coordination found in PBSS2.0 reflect a response to failures of both the 
market and government intervention in previous iterations of PBSS. Again these studies are 
 
 
useful in understanding some of the failures of governance but see (more or less successful) 
PBSS as an outcome of governance, rather than a central way in which governance (and 
subjects) are produced.  
 
Mobility we would argue is a powerful yet under-researched force in the reshaping of 
governance and related socio-spatial arrangements. Despite some theoretical expositions 
(Baerenholdt 2013; Kitchin et al 2009; Manderscheid 2014; Urry 2000) there is little literature 
in the mobilities turn exploring the impacts of new forms of mobility/communication on 
existing modes of governance. This is all the more surprising given the centrality of this theme 
in the new mobilities paradigm (de Souza E Sliva 2006; Sheller & Urry 2006; Urry 2000). On 
the one hand, new ICTs and resulting forms of shared mobility have produced new connectivity, 
often positioning them as, “seemingly liberating tools, allowing citizens to engage in ever more 
democratic actions” and become active and self-ruling participants in the governance of 
environment and mobility (Gabrys, 2014, p. 42; McLaren & Agyeman, 2015). On the other 
hand, “the distributed and networked nature of technologies” also produces new 
environmental/mobile subjects; the transformation of socio-spatial relationships; and more 
complex networks with heterogeneous actors (Bærenholdt, 2013; Wang, 2015, p. 323). The 
recent rapid development of PBSS in China provides an apposite case study through which to 
explore these reconfigurations and their outcomes. In particular, new technologies 
and degrees of control have the potential to create more complicated monitoring or governing 
at a distance, reshaping power geometries and contradictions within new mobility governance 
arrangements (Gabrys, 2014; Spinney & Lin, 2018). 
 
Taking the transformative process and struggle from PBSS 1.0 to PBSS 2.0 in Shanghai as its 
object of study, this paper aims to develop the Foucauldian perspective of dispositive to 
investigate and conceptualize the shifts in governance that both produce and arise from this 
 
 
shift. A number of mobilities scholars have suggested a Foucauldian approach is insightful 
when investigating the socio-political construction and governance of mobility in relation to 
the interaction between knowledge, power and mobile subject-building (Bærenholdt, 2013; 
Manderscheid, Schwanen, & Tyfield, 2015, pp. 2-3). In particular, calls to understand the 
reshaping of urban environments and citizens through mobility haves challenged our 
understanding of governance which usually refers to a more traditional “territorial fixity by 
bonds and borders” with corresponding governing administration and regulation (Bærenholdt, 
2013, p. 20; Jensen, 2011). More recent accounts challenge such fixity arguing instead for a 
focus on the flow and freedom of different urban subjects, by which different socio-political 
dimensions and related stakeholders are connected dynamically and contingently (ibid). 
Baerenholdt (2013) refers to this as ‘governmobility’ – governing through mobility. In this 
context, the dispositive perspective can help to explore the heterogeneity and dynamism of 
assemblage and connections between different knowledges, political rationalities, agendas, and 
urban subjects and objects (Manderscheid et al. 2015). In particular, it is useful in exploring 
the “productive power of complex socio-material or socio-technical arrangements” rather than 
relatively, “simplistic hierarchical perspectives” that usually refer to pre-defined actors, agency 
and discipline (Braun, 2014; Gailing, 2016, p. 244; 255). 
 
By using Shanghai’s ongoing development of PBSS as a case study, this paper aims to explore 
and highlight governing failures and changing dispositive characteristics in the shift from the 
PBSS 1.0 to PBSS 2.0. In doing so it seeks to make two main contributions: firstly by working 
at the boundaries of Foucault-inspired work on urban governance and mobilities scholarship it 
seeks to progress our understanding of the ways in which increasingly mobile and fluid 
connections are reshaping governing relations. Secondly, it provides a much needed case study 
of mobility governance in an Asian context, adding to a nascent literature (Tyfield 2014; 2015; 
Zuev et al 2019) on this topic. The paper is divided into five sections. Firstly, we develop our 
 
 
conceptual framework of dispositive in relation to the socio-political production of subjects, 
which we theorise as a continuing performance influenced by environmental interventions or 
‘environmentality’ (Gabrys 2018). In the second section we illustrate that in responding to twin 
matters of concern: cosmopolitan rationality and urban illness, PBSS 1.0 has been shaped as a 
state-led dispositive that articulates a political rationality and ‘mobility-fix’ (Spinney 2016). In 
the third section we build upon this by investigating the localization of PBSS 1.0 and China’s 
local pastoral politics. We illustrate how the pastoral governance of PBSS 1.0 results in a 
fragmented governance, disconnected service and confined constrained mobile subjects that 
ultimately result in a failure to produce the desired mobile subjects. In the fourth section, we 
explore the emergence of PBSS 2.0 as a more ‘efficient’ dispositive that addresses the failures 
of PBSS 1.0. In particular we explore the production of an ‘unbounded’ mobile subject better 
capable of performing the desired green mobility, and representing a more efficient and 
effective assemblage to deliver diverse political-economic demands. In the fifth and final 
section, we show how tensions within and between PBSS 2.0 operators, citizens and state actors 
have rendered the dispositive and related mobile subjects ungovernable. We argue that both 
public and private sectors have failed to fully comprehend and deliberate upon the 
heterogeneous and dynamic nature of the emergent dispositive. 
 
2. The concept of dispositive in exploring mobility and its spatiality 
A dispositive refers to “the nature of connection” or network between/of “heterogeneous 
elements” that were previously disconnected and even contradictory but are assembled into a 
new “strategic assemblage”, or more “decentered totality” (Braun, 2014, p. 52; Foucault, 1980, 
p. 194). Mincke and Lemonne (2015) have shown that the study of dispositive and mobility 
requires more than exploring the issues of transportation or mobility itself. Rather, it focuses 
attention on the complex formation, process or transformation of social-technical, 
heterogeneous ensembles, and the relations and productive power between governing elements 
 
 
inside/outside specific forms of mobility, or between mobile and immobile subjects (Gailing, 
2016; Mincke & Lemonne, 2015). Thus Braun (2014) and Raffnsøe, et al (2016) have 
suggested that the concept of dispositive can address weaknesses identified in past Foucauldian 
approaches where relations are characterized as less discipline-led, contingent, and more 
contingent, heterogeneous and fluid. In the following sections, we illustrate and develop three 
aspects of this concept for studying mobility.:  
 
Firstly, the dispositive perspective foregrounds the socio-political production of new subjects 
that respond to matters of concern (Agamben 2009, 5; Manderscheid et al. , 2015). 
Investigating mobility by dispostive thinking, as Manderscheid (2014, p. 609) suggests, 
requires asking the question, “what are mobility dispositifs a solution to?” which relates to 
“what happened and what changed so that mobility as an object of knowledge” becomes an 
object “and a practice to be governed [and] moved to the fore?” On the one hand, the 
understanding of an emerging dispositive and corresponding subjectification relates to urgent 
crises or “specific purposes at a particular historical conjuncture” where “particular challenges 
and predicaments, constitutes, runs through, and changes the principal institutions and 
organizations” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. 10; Raffnsøe et al., 2016, p. 280). In this reading, 
the rationale of any emerging new dispositive and subjects fundamentally relates to the 
identification and proposed solutions of specific urgencies, and the process, political rationality 
and agenda to respond. On the other hand, exploration of any reconfiguration can begin from 
the failure, struggle and negation of the old subject, such as previous policy agendas or 
mechanisms (Foucault, 1980; Raffnsøe et al., 2016). Instead of returning to “the humanist 
concept of the subject”, Wang (2015, p. 323) suggests, the focus should be to “understand how 
the self becomes traversed by multiple techniques and discourses that take the subject as their 
domain of problematization” (Mincke & Lemonne, 2015). Accordingly our understanding of 
the dispositive of mobility, as Agamben (2009) and Manderscheid (2014, p. 615) state, can 
 
 
begin from exploring the failures of previous subjects that may, for instance, force the new 
“formation and control of mobile individuals and collectives through the exercise of power.” 
In terms of researching public bikes, the failures of PBSS1.0, and imperatives of green mobility 
and the sharing economy provide an opportunist process that produces new dispositive and 
solutions. 
 
Secondly, the formation of a dispositive also concerns (re-)producing relations, connections or 
even conflicts between heterogeneous elements of governance. For Foucault (2000, p. 337), 
the characteristics of power could be understood through deconstructing the “play relations 
between individuals... between partners.” As this implies, exploring the opportunist “process 
of ‘wayfinding’” plays a key role in the analysis of dispositive, since “each action and each 
related intention are intersected by other actions; and because of this interaction, the result is 
never fully pre-determined” (Raffnsøe et al., 2016, p. 286). Differently from traditional 
organization studies, the concept of dispositive questions the decisive and close relationship 
between agency and change, and blurs the “sharp distinction between inside and outside the 
organization, and between the individual and the collective” (Braun, 2014; Raffnsøe et al., 
2016, p. 274). For Foucault (1980, p. 195), “there is a perpetual process of strategic 
elaboration” that seeks to deliberate and justify the more “efficient and rational method that 
could be applied to” issues of governing. Thus, a key question from a dispositive perspective 
refers to “how diffuse and contingent social processes produce particular kinds of subjects and 
meanings”, and seeks to understand “the normativity emerging in what is done” or the 
intentional or unintentional process of transforming subjects and ways of governance (Gailing, 
2016, p. 249; Raffnsøe et al., 2016, p. 284). In mobilities research, the value of such a 
perspective is to inspire researchers to investigate the socio-political construction of “the 
interrelatedness of mobilities and power/inequalities”, and the inconsistencies and 
contradictions between different subjects or governing elements that can disclose the 
 
 
multidimensional “patterns of power structuration” (Manderscheid, 2014, p. 605). 
 
Thirdly, the relations of a dispositive are shaped and (de)stabilized by the continuing 
performance of subjects and related environmental/spatial interventions. In terms of 
understanding the collectivity (dispositive)-building and power-structure within heterogeneous 
elements or subjects, relations should be accepted and performed between/by them, that “are 
key to understanding how modes of governance, ways of life, and political possibilities emerge 
or are sustained” (Gabrys, 2014, p. 36; Van der Duim, 2007). Similarly, Manderscheid (2014, 
p. 619) states that the interplay between elements of a dispositive, “are continuously performed 
and enacted by moving and immobile bodies”, in which the development of dispositive should 
be understood as relational to the socio-political performance of the subject within its 
corresponding spatial or environmental arrangements. Gabrys (2014) argues that the 
production and performance of the subject is governed by “an environmental type of 
intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals.” Gabrys (2014, p. 34) calls this 
‘environmentality’ where influencing the “rules of the game” is accomplished through the 
modulation and regulation of environments rather than merely “subject-based or population-
based distributions of governance.” Accordingly, the ways in which dispositives shape (and are 
shaped by) new mobile landscapes and related material-political relations involving 
heterogeneous sectors and stakeholders becomes an important focus of attention. This is 
primarily because these serve to sustain the performance and diffusion of new subjects within 
a specific urban milieu that “generates material–spatial arrangements in which and through 
which, distinct dispositifs, or apparatuses, operate” (Gabrys, 2014, p. 34; Spinney & Lin, 2019). 
Indeed, the production and governance of new mobilities is fundamentally linked to the 
regeneration of the urban environment, and thus environmentality plays a crucial role in 
analyzing the practice of a dispositive.  
 
 
 
The following sections represent the results of our main empirical investigation in Shanghai1 
based upon two main sources. The first relates to a series of researcher observations, in-depth 
interviews and group discussions organised by the authors with the help from related experts 
of local universities, and transportation and planning authoritiesy, between April 2016 and 
January 2018. The key interviewees and participants include 5 planning/transport experts or 
and scholars, 6 officials from city and district government level to street office, 4 private sector 
representatives (including staff from Mobike, Ofo and Shanghai Forever’ Bicycle 
Cooperation), and 4 cycling-related third sector representatives (such as The Association of 
Bike Industriesy). The second set of sources include government reports and strategy 
documents, and media and news reports relating to the emergence and issuesimplementation 
of PBSS 1.0 and PBSS 2.0 in Shanghai and China more broadly.  
 
3. PBSS 1.0 in Shanghai: a state-led dispositive concerned to ‘fix’ mobility through 
production of the ‘right’ subjects 
The recent cycling ‘renaissance’ and surge of interest in PBSS in China is the result of a re-
construction of cycling’s socio-political position in the process of modernizing cities (Spinney 
2016; Spinney 2020 forthcomingSpinney & Lin 2019). Whilst the 1990s saw many Chinese 
cities set targets to reduce cycling because it was deemed to reduce road efficiency and 
 
1 Our decision to focus on Shanghai was to some extent driven initially by fortune in the beginning: 
the authors were already conducting work on PBSS1.0 in other cities and had just started to talk to 
policy advisors in Shanghai when the dockless firms arrived in force in 2016. Other factors also make 
Shanghai an apposite case study: its importance as a test-bed for other Chinese cities and a global lens 
into the new China makes what happens in the city highly relevant both domestically and globally. In 
addition to this, central Shanghai is relatively bike- friendly in its layout and was one of the Chinese 
cities that chose not to ban E-bikes. Accordingly our ‘choice’ of case study is justified because of the 
influence exerted on other Chinese cities by precedents in handling of policy and innovation within 
the city. 
 
 
symbolize backwardness (SMPG 2002, 29-32) its fortunes have taken an upward turn in the 
last decade. 
From around 2007 there were signs of a policy shift from central and city government due to 
the manifestation of a range of issues from the motorisation of mobility in relation to 
cosmopolitan discourses of green mobility. By 2009, China had become the largest global 
market for automobiles, but addressing the side-effects of this expansion (including traffic 
congestion, air pollution and land shortage (Hu, 2012; Lee & Xu, 2012) became increasingly 
urgent (Sartor 2011). According to the "Shanghai Urban Transport Operation Annual Report 
2015", the growth of the motor vehicle and private car has far outstripped the capacity of 
current traffic infrastructure and the growth of new roads (SUTA, 2015) resulting in a 
government strategy similar to Travel Demand Management (TDM) focused on re-distribution 
of ‘right-of-way’ for cycling. Borrowing from schemes observed overseas, a new dispositive 
coalesced around PBSS1.0 as a means of practicing a green mobility that could represent a 
‘healthier’ and new ‘progressive’ rhetoric of political rationality (or conduct).  
 
In addition to internal concerns, the pro-cycling policy shift through PBSS is partly the result 
of external forces at the global scale, through which cycling is repositioned as a new 
progressive subject of mobility. These external forces manifest as a cosmopolitan rationality of 
green mobility that reproduces “superficial discursive similarities” of “western-centric 
accounts” through diverse international events in China (Spinney & Lin, 2018; Zuev et al., 
2019). In 2008 for example, the first large-scale public bike rental systemPBSS opened in 
conjunction with the Beijing Olympic Games. It signified to a global audience that China was 
pursuing a new urban modernity towards green mobility that would address traffic congestion 
and environmental issues (Lee & Xu, 2012; Spinney & Lin, 2018). At the same time, the 
promotion of PBSS was also meant to demonstrate to local governments that they should seek 
to produce more progressive mobile subjects. Consequently, the urban cyclist has been 
 
 
repositioned as the healthier and more progressive subject required to respond to both the 
cities’ies’ local illnesses and cosmopolitan image building. In line with these matters of concern, 
from around 2010, PBSS 1.0 has been widely promoted as a practical and cost-effective 
mechanism to materialize a top-down conduct of green mobility, and state-led dispositive that 
seeks to produce cycling subjects.  
 
As a result, green mobility embodied in PBSS has been constructed as a multi-scalar agenda to 
conduct major cities, local states and communities. City governments across China were asked 
to build 100 model experimental PBSS projects that would be operational before 2015. 
Shanghai featured as one of the test-beds for this policy with five Shanghai districts2 and 
associated SOs Street Offices experimenting with PBSS 1.0 in 2009. After this, the growth of 
PBSS 1.0 is comparatively rapid: by 2014 (according to the ‘Bike Sharing World Map’) China 
possessed over half the public bikes in the world, with Shanghai ranked 9th in the world for 
the size of its fleet3. Our interviews confirmed that by early 2017 Shanghai had almost 80,000 
PBSS 1.0 bikes putting it amongst the top 5 cities for PBSS worldwide. PBSS 1.0 it seemed 
was an economical and fast way to practice the new mobility. As one SMPG policy advisor 
commented ‘the public bike is relatively easy to achieve the higher traffic rate with less cost…’ 
In this respect, urban cycling and PBSS function as what Spinney (2016, p. 455) calls a 
‘mobility fix’ that represents an alternative and contingent “second best” solution seeking to 
deal with problems of accumulation (such as increased congestion and corresponding loss of 
productivity) by acting through mobility.  
 
 
2 They are Pudong, Minhang, Baoshan, Songjiang, Changning districts. By 2014, they builtthese 
districts had created 912 PBSS 1.0 docking stations, with 26,000 bikes. See 
http://www.qle.me/detail/index/2339.。 
3 http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1265087 
 
 
For central government, PBSS 1.0 also represents a localized solution that can conduct 
local states and communities to exercise the self-governance of mobility-fix at a distance, thus 
avoiding any potential backlash from citizens. The aspirations of the Chinese central 
government to implement PBSS become devolved mainly through a reorientation of governing 
mobility down to the local district and its SO in the community administration 
level. For example, the ‘Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction’ (2013) announced 
a ‘Demonstration Project for Urban Pedestrian and Bicycle Transportation System’ through 
which it sought to promote international standards on cycle planning and design for those at 
the local level to follow. In Shanghai, as local SO officials’ recalled, they were encouraged to 
operationalise this conduct by taking responsibility to build their own PBSS based on their 
interpretation of the guidance. This clearly places a distance between the centre and the citizen 
because the shape that PBSS takes is seen to be determined at the local level with the centre 
acting only as a guide. Related to this, the design of PBSS is clearly materialized as an 
environmental intervention seeking to reshape the city’s landscape of mobility, for example by 
linking the PBSS with local tourism or science parks.  
 
This devolved implementation (and ultimate failure) of PBSS1.0 was also characterized by a 
pastoral mode of state-led governance which led to the fragmentation of neighbouring PBSS. 
This situation, as a cycling policy expert explained in interview, came about because local 
leaders saw it as an opportunity to articulate an ethic of care for their citizens:  
 
‘[they] decide to spend money on local… people to give them this kind welfare… This 
guides by a power of will, that is to say, I set up this thing and give it free by my will, not 
a market operation... or professional decision’  
 
This leader-led implementation refers to Lin and Kuo’s (2013) concept of territorialised 
 
 
‘pastorship’ of governing social welfare and communities. In this pastoral relationship of 
governance, the governors gain legitimacy from their people not necessarily by legal or 
professional administration, but by demonstrating his/her kindness or political 
rightnessrighteousness, like a pastor demonstrating benevolence and truth to his flock (Lin & 
Kuo, 2013). However, this self-governing territorialised ‘pastorship’ causes a political-
economic fragmentation and unevenness of PBSS 1.0 because local leaders want to take credit 
for it (in order to be recognized as benevolent and progressive), and therefore ensure it mainly 
operates within their territory. For example one SO official recalled his experience of system 
implementation noting that the city and district government ‘never take it as their matter to 
coordinate… you just make your own deal [with the system provider] and develop your own 
system…’. As such each local leader implements a form of environmentality that is contingent 
upon reproducing their own spheres of power and therefore tightly bounded. For example with 
geographical segregation of administration, each district or street officeDO or SO has a 
‘separate’ registration centre, and no capability for users to borrow and return bikes across 
‘invisible’ boundaries. As a result, the operational spheres of PBSS1.0 generally map to the 
geographical jurisdiction and political resources of district governments or street officesDO or 
SO with little or no collaboration between them. Whilst some adjoining areas may have a well 
developed PBSS1.0, other neighbouring districts may have less, different incompatible or no 
PBSS at all. The corollary of this territorially bounded dispositive and its environmentality is 
the production of a fragmented landscape of public cycling and confined mobile subjects of 
PBSS. Consequently, the environmentality of PBSS1.0 is heavily bounded by the territorial 
constraints of local government and the technical constraints of PBSS1.0 operation.   
 
A further problem arising from the way in which PBSS1.0 manifested was due to the fact that 
it became a marginalized and symbolic performance existing in Shanghai’s periphery rather 
than the centre where the green mobility-fix was deemed to be more urgently required. Indeed, 
 
 
PBSS stakeholders were faced with numerous obstacles in trying to expand their service in 
central Shanghai. For example, rigid regulations excluded the construction of ‘fixed’ docking 
infrastructure in many inner-city areas.4 Although the ‘Shanghai Forever’ bicycle cooperation 
is the largest sub-contracted provider of PBSS1.0 infrastructure, it still suffered difficulties 
meeting related regulations as the manager explained: 
 
‘in the city centre, the requirement of sidewalk width to build the bike docks is higher. 
We have been forced to consider only building on the sidewalk that is more than 3.5 
meters wide… and many sidewalks cannot meet this standard… We also need to avoid 
the interference of ‘tactile route for the blind…’ 
 
Compounding this, local government and property owners within the inner city also stated that 
they were less interested in dealing with the infrastructure or land issues related to development 
of PBSS1.0 because of the limited ‘political’ and ‘financial’ capital it could generate compared 
to property-led regeneration. As a result of these deterrents in central areas, the development 
of PBSS 1.0 and related mobile subjects has largely been confined to the small administrative 
territories of rural and peripheral areas with the result that PBSS has been marginalized from 
the inner-city area. Whilst there are nine DO or SO (such 
as Minhang District or Pudong Street Office) that have developed PBSS 1.0, none of them are 
in central Shanghai where poor air quality, congestion and lack of space are at their worst and 
the schemes could have the most positive impact. 
 
The result of this piecemeal approach is the existence of multiple disconnected, peripheral, 
 
4 In addition to such planning issues, Shanghai’s push to accommodate cars means that bikes are 
banned from many main roads and there are insufficient spaces left for bikes to park or ride safely in 
central Shanghai. 
 
 
small ‘cycling kingdoms’ of pastoral governors that are only sporadically capable of producing 
an environmentality that could allow subjects to perform the desired green mobility. 
Exemplifying this, when observing two allegedly well-used PBSS 1.0 stations during field 
work we found not a single user during one week of daily observations. When interviewing 
local NGOs and users, whilst most of them regarded PBSS 1.0 as a morally ‘good’ mobility, 
they also noted it was a failed service that was unattractive and inconvenient to most citizens. 
One local planning official from Shanghai’s Pudong Ddistrict admitted that as a result the main 
function of PBSS 1.0 was symbolic in that itto associated Shanghai with a cosmopolitan 
rationality of cycling: “It is like to create a feeling of coming to live or work here is like foreign 
countries…?” In this context, the confined and fixed environmentality of PBSS1.0 cannot 
produce desirable effects and related mobile subjects leading to a failure of physical (and 
symbolic) performance, pre-empting a new matter of concern and setting the stage for PBSS 
2.0. 
 
4. The emergence of PBSS 2.0 as a more efficient and legitimated dispositive: its birth, 
escape and reconnection  
PBSS 2.0 as a new dispositive emerges from a process of subjectification that seeks to produce 
‘location-free’ and ‘regulation-free’ mobile subjects who can not only address the fragmented 
and confined failures of PBSS 1.0 but who are also capable of achieving the economies of scale 
and scope required by surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019, anonymised 2020 forthcoming). 
Agamben (2009) states that our understanding of a dispositive can begin from illustrating the 
emergence of new subjects in relation to the crises of governing socio-political affairs. In this 
instance, PBSS 2.0 evidently emerges from the intersection of two crises: the first refers to 
PBSS 1.0, particularly its territorial limitations and fragmented governance; the second from 
the need to put idle technology and capital to use after the failure of car-sharing firms Uber & 
Didi. By enabling smart-phonised users to unlock and activate bikes everywhere, PBSS 2.0 
 
 
produces new hybrid mobile subjects no longer bound within specific locations or territories to 
access bikes (and subjects who also generate potentially valuable data for the Internet giants 
who have invested heavily in the PBSS2.0 firms Mobike and Ofo5 ). One SMPG transport 
consultant provided a metaphor to contrast the fixed PBSS 1.0 and flexible PBSS 2.0 and 
explain the latter’s rapid growth: ‘it is like bus and taxi, one you need to find a station, the other 
doesn’t matter’. This spatial unmooring also reflects and produces a governmental unmooring 
where the user/mobile subject is neither territorially or politically part of the planned and 
pastoral governance of PBSS. Rather PBSS 2.0 represents a market-led and bottom-up 
dispositive constituted through the convergence of digital platforms, mobile access points and 
enormous numbers of ‘free’ cycling subjects that can expand to the whole city6.  
 
As this suggests, a key difference between PBSS 1.0 and PBSS 2.0 as a dispositive is not only 
a freeing up of infrastructure from locative fixity, but also a freeing-up of locative pastoral 
governance and environmentality previously predicated upon the rationalities, regulations and 
 
5 By June 2017 Mobike had secured funding of almost US$1 billion and was valued at US$3 billion 
in the same month (Crunchbase 2019:n.p). By 2019 Ofo had raised US$2.2 billion in funding (ibid). 
Alongside venture capitalists, the main investors included web-giants Alibaba, Tencent and Meituan-
Dianping (ibid). 
6 That is not to say that it has been all plain sailing for either firm: 2018 saw a marked downturn in the 
outlook for PBSS 2.0 with Mobike (and a sizeable chunk of its debt) acquired by Chinese web company 
Meituan-Dianping for US$2.7 billion in April 2018 with a name change from Mobike to Meituan Bike 
confirmed on January 23, in January 2019 (Crunchbase 2019:n.p). In December 2018 Ofo was fined 
for defaulting on debt and on the verge of bankruptcy;, sued by suppliers, had assets frozen (Hu, 
2019:n.p) and was banned from operating in Singapore, one of its main territories (Dowling 2019:n.p).  
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politics of governing mobility and urban spaces. The previous agenda underpinning fixed 
PBSS1.0 stems from ‘top-down’ rationalities seeking to implement political conduct through 
green mobility; to govern fixed objects (infrastructure) and static subjects (fixed access users) 
within a bounded socio-political sphere rather than the governance of dynamic and socio-
political interrelating mobilities (Bærenholdt, 2013; Lemke, 2015). In contrast the flexible 
locative rationality of PBSS2.0 is generated through the information collected from the 
communication between the GPS enabled smartphone; the PBSS operator’s phone app; and the 
GPS-enabled bike (as well as a whole host of back-end technology). This architecture is geared 
toward mobilizing both bikes and citizens, enabling service providers to develop a more 
accurate understanding and mapping of PBSS users dynamics and demands in relation to bike 
distribution or further business expansion7. The metaphor used by Hu (the founder of market 
leader - Mobike) in 2017 to describe this is one of robots circulating Shanghai everywhere, 
governed by the intelligences and requirements of mobile citizens8. Tyfield (2014) has been at 
pains to point out the connections between (auto)mobility and broader geo-political and 
economic hegemony (587, see also Tyfield 2018). A selective and celebratory reading by this 
intervieweeHu ignores the broader role of capital in governing relations, instead positioning 
the PBSS 2.0 mobility subject as the key agent in shaping a new urban milieu and flexible 
environmentality. This represents a situation where as Gabrys (2014, p. 38) points out, 
“governance…. of the urban milieu occurs not through delineations of territory, but through 
enabling the connections and processes of everyday urban inhabitations within computational 
modalities”. The rationality guiding PBSS 2.0 is much less ‘certain’ and governed by the 
emergent daily mobility needs of hybridized users to spread ‘new’ sharing bikes contingently 
 
7 In 2017 field work, a Mobike internal report has beenwas shown to us, in which Mobike maps and 
analyzes all user data to understand the general pattern of Mobike’s mobility to rethink its further 
future strategies.   
8 See local news: https://kknews.cc/zh-tw/tech/v9q9jx4.html 
 
 
and collectively.  
 
The flexibility outlined above is also materialized and exemplified in the fact that PBSS 2.0 
becomes unmoored from planning and administrative regulations. Such freedom represents a 
significant advantage for institutional capital in competition with other PBSS (Schneider, 
Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010). This was argued by one PBSS 1.0 contractor as a source 
of inequality: ‘there are strict limits for us, such as official regulation or administration of 
sidewalk, the blind path or building docks… [PBSS 2.0] becomes free from these because 
of its dockless system…’. Here the contractor bemoans the fact that PBSS 2.0 providers can 
side-step planning regulations and permissions, and avoid long negotiations or rigid 
administration to require, for instance, parking places or access to public electricity systems 
for docking stations. Whilst most accounts of PBSS 2.0 focus on its key innovation as one of 
incorporating PBSS into the internet of things, a number of interviewees noted somewhat 
sarcastically that the ‘real innovation of PBSS 2.0 is in enabling institutional capital the 
freedom to escape from the limits that have confined both the physical and human elements of 
the PBSS assemblage’.   
 
The point we wish to draw out from this discussion is that the self-conducting and self-
sustaining PBSS 2.0 is evidently – albeit temporarily as we discuss in the next section - de-
territorialised geographically and politically. Because locations are generated through the 
interaction of physical and virtual user mobility, users are free to connect with diverse 
administrative territories, places and people to perform as the new geographical and social 
assemblage. In becoming spatially unmoored with regard to access, the mobility and expansion 
of PBSS 2.0 is no longer dependent to the political leadership of pastoral governance, territory 
and financial support of a District or SO. As a senior local planner pointed out in interview, 
‘previously, if you want to run PBSS, you need to win the bid to let local leaders buy your 
 
 
service. Now, you only need a mobile APP, and a bike with a ‘smart lock’’. PBSS 2.0 is 
evidently freed from the specific standards, bidding or service requirements that are linked to 
the political concern and domination of the local governor and their territory. As a result, PBSS 
2.0 bikes pour into any locations their enterprisesthat operators and users are willing to 
useentertain, quickly filling in the gaps of the fragmented PBSS 1.0, particularly around the 
city centre, key attractions, and busy metro or bus stations. Consequently, the PBSS 2.0 
assemblage escapes from previous political rationality, regulation and pastoral 
territorialisation, creating decentralized and (seemingly) horizontal networks between different 
mobilities and fragmented territories where none are given priority except in the context of 
their contingent emergence through use.  
 
PBSS 2.0 as an emerging dispositive also produces new entrepreneurial subjects in ‘moral 
clothing’ that hybridizes the concepts of green mobility and sharing economy. Inspired by ride-
sharing platforms Uber and DiDi, PBSS 2.0 enterprises ‘smartphonize’ the ‘old’ cycling 
business through APP platforms, and in so doing, represent themselves (and cycling) as the 
new cutting-edge enterprise of ICT and sharing mobility. This resonates with Curran and 
Tyfield (2017) who have argued that high status, high technology goods are central to the 
character of Chinese low-carbon transition (133). By fitting with this dominant national 
narrative these enterprises gain a strong moral justification to avoid any official administrative 
burden in running a transport/cycling business. For example, although all bike manufacturers 
and service providers have to join the ‘Association of Bike Industry’ and accept its 
administration, this is not the case for PBSS 2.0 providers as a local scholar explained: 
 
 
 
[PBSS 2.0] is like Uber or DiDi9 . Previously, you need to follow the regulations of 
administrating administrative regulations of athe taxi company to have business 
registrations and certificatione. However, if you have been labelled as ‘sharing’, 
then…[you can avoid these]. [PBSS 2.0] is following… it usually frames itself as neither 
a bike-rental nor [public bike] company 
 
Nonetheless, DiDi has faced serious challenges in Shanghai from its chaotic administration10, 
as a local official illustrated, “people always argued it is actually an unregistered taxi company 
with unlicensed and unregulated taxis and drivers.” By combining entrepreneurial, innovation, 
sharing, and green mobility associations, PBSS 2.0 seeks to legitimate it within multiple frames 
and avoid scrutiny by representing itself as an exceptional and ‘unprecedented’ (Zuboff 2019) 
subject above any blame. Indeed, PBSS 2.0 represents itself, as Spinney (2016) has argued, as 
‘apple pie’ and relies on the fact implication that no one can critique such a ‘righteous’ thing. 
Formed from the entrance of a new mobile technology conjoining with existing physical 
mobility; the result is newly moralized (green) target for the development of sharing economy 
and related capital. As one local transport planner said duringin interview: 
 
The Nation highly supports innovation and sharing economy, the sharing car is the first 
pot of gold to dig… But government has applied stringent control, so it is not hot any 
 
9 DiDi is a Chinese version of Uber that has been regarded as a one of the forerunners of China’s 
sharing economy. 
10 Uber China was acquired by DiDi Chuxing Enterprise in 2016 and subsequently exited the Chinese 
market. However, DiDi’s reputation has been severely tarnished by a series of scandals relating to bad 
management, criminal driver behavior and customer safety; alongside moral questions regarding its 
role in low carbon transition given the contribution of ride hailing to worsening air population 
pollution and traffic jamscongestion (https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/06/didi-safety-pivot/). 
 
 
more… When the sharing bikes emerge as something good and green, capital finds its 
new opportunity.  
 
The unexpected and rapid boom of PBSS 2.0 is partly due to the re-orientation of existing 
‘smartphonized mobility’ toward another form of mobility after its original path (ride-sharing) 
was suppressed. It represents, as Gailing (2016) and Braun (2014) suggest, the contingent and 
path-finding characteristics of a dispositive, in this instance driven by capital. The hybrid 
mobility of PBSS 2.0 helps to confront previous critiques of capital speculation (as unregulated) 
in previous versions of sharing mobility, such as DiDi because it is allied to unassailable 
nationally important narratives of low carbon transition and technological innovation. In doing 
so it helps to create an ‘opportunist’ path for capital accumulation with the least regulation and 
greatest legitimation.  
 
This new political-economic territory forms part of a contingent, horizontal and strategic 
assemblage; a dispositive that Braun (2014, p. 61) describes as a decentered and 
“heterogeneous totality”, a horizontal network that has no top-down rationality or singular 
leader (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). Such an interpretation is backed up by a key policy 
advisor within Shanghai’s Transportation Commission, commenting that PBSS 2.0 does not fit 
into the conventional state-led and planned transportation construction because it has ‘involved 
different third party organisations and many new service suppliers… And also different 
authorities have been involved, no matter if they are willing or not…’. Indeed, PBSS 2.0 forms 
a privately-led dispositive with the involvement of multiple stakeholders (including an abstract 
rendering of the citizen) that were previously outside of transportation administration, 
including the planning department, ‘Urban Management Teams’, and community-based SOs. 
 
Accordingly we wish to emphasise the importance of ICTs into reshaping not only the 
 
 
constitution but also the nature of relations in the dispositive. The introduction of ICTs into the 
dispositive reshapes it by cutting out particular actors (planners, District officials) and 
foregrounding the importance of others (phones, apps, entrepreneurs, citizens). It also changes 
the relationship between these actors: whereas there was seen to be a territorially-specific 
political ‘bond’ between user and local leader, there is now a distant and virtualized ICT 
mediated connection between PBSS2.0 operator and the user. Similarly, where there was a legal 
duty that bound provider with the planning authority, this bond is broken due to the unmooring 
of PBSS materialities. This shifts the social relations within the dispositive from bounded, 
proximate and physical to unbounded, distant and virtual.  
 
It has been argued by the Xinhua News Agency that the Planning Department has been 
inefficient in providing the infrastructure and environment for the slow city and cycling 
renaissance11. Nonetheless, PBSS 2.0 is seen to have helped perform the slow city and cycling 
renaissance within diverse urban spaces of central Shanghai through contingent mobility rather 
than planning. As one senior planning official commented: ‘Bikes have returned…We don’t 
need to worry about recruiting citizens to our slow city schemes now...’ For the planning 
authority, the wide application of PBSS 2.0 has helped to develop a far greater number of users 
and successful image of the new green paradigm than they had achieved through the past PBSS 
1.0 or slow city building agenda. The unexpected sprawl of PBSS 2.0 has been regarded as a 
much more effective and efficient mobility-fix through privatisation and digitalization of public 
bike provision. It also released different authorities and local state actors from the burden/ duty 
of sharing the socio-political responsibilities to realise the policy targets of utilizing green-
mobility, or the last mile solutions through cycling. As a leading planner of PuDong district 
noted,  
 
11 See http://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-09/11/content_1700780.htm 
 
 
 
‘[These companies] neither ask for your help or management, nor want you to 
subsidize… You don’t need to worry about extension of underground or bus lines… 
People can ride from anywhere to their home… It is handy both for government and 
people...’  
 
The local state has little choice but to embrace PBSS 2.0’s autonomic and unexpected 
expansion because it is seen to ‘fix’ intractable urban problems through its dynamism and 
responsiveness to user mobility; as well as also again not requiring additional public resources 
and fixed infrastructure. Because of its perceived benefits, PBSS 2.0 forces new reactive and 
contingent forms of governance to emerge. It represents a seemingly horizontal assemblage 
that connects different socio-political elements, and reduces, but does not completely abolish, 
the need for strategic and economic governance into the existing relations (Gailing, 2016; 
Rabinow & Rose, 2003). We would emphasise the ‘seemingly’ here because as Zuboff (2019); 
Krivy (2018); Smith (2016); and Spinney (2020 forthcoming) have argued, such systems are 
driven by surveillance capitalism and render users as powerful agents only as far as they are 
generative of data: users are not empowered to know the extent of data gathered or invited to 
assist in its analysis. 
 
However, it is clear that PBSS 2.0 not only reconnects previously fragmented territories 
through location-free mobile subjects, but also shapes a more horizontal and strategic 
assemblage capable of operationalising an environmentality that functions more effectively in 
relation to specific matters of concern. As Agamben (2009) and Braun (2014) comment, it 
incorporates and governs heterogeneous elements or ‘living beings’ that were previously 
uncapturable and ungovernable. Within SMPG’s (2016) comprehensive strategy of developing 
Shanghai, PBSS 2.0 is identified as a core way in which new urbanism, livable and attractive 
 
 
humanity, and sustainable and low-carbon ecology can be achieved at more than just a symbolic 
level. In interview, a leading official planner exemplified this by arguing that the flow of PBSS 
2.0 had enabled new natural, connected and contingent flows of commuting, leisure and sport 
activities and facilities to emerge in Pudong’s entrepreneurial park, which in turn had shaped 
the ‘new lifestyle of the creative talent, science and technology people.’ Through the 
intersection of ICT-led sharing and green mobility, PBSS represents a legitimated and 
‘efficient’ mobility-fix and environmentality that works through the reproduction of aggregated 
active cycling subjects.  
 
5. The struggle to govern the ungovernable dispositive and ‘uncivilized’ mobile subjects 
Whilst PBSS2.0 was hailed early on due to its citizen-centred responsiveness, that same 
responsiveness itself soon became a matter of concern which in turn has pushed back upon the 
emergent dispositive. PBSS2.0 spread so rapidly between 2016-17 due to inter-firm 
competition, absence of regulation, and the need for scale, scope and action (see Zuboff 2019) 
that it produced a surfeit of bikes (by August 2017 there were 1.5 million public bikes in the 
city) alongside much less predictable and seemingly 
‘ungovernable’ mobile subjects. Boundless freedom and citizen-led conduct became not only 
the strength of PBSS 2.0 but also its key weakness, a fact that was picked up by the international 
news media. For example, a  commentary in the ‘New York Times’ 
noted that,  
 
In many urban areas, carelessly parked bikes encroach on limited sidewalk space already 
crowded with pedestrians and street vendors. Bikes with missing wheels and shattered 
 
 
frames pop up in bushes and rivers. Cases of theft and accidents have made newspaper 
headlines12.  
 
Indeed for local government, since late 2016, the environmentality of PBSS2.0 rapidly turned 
into a problem. This was backed up by our interviews and observations. For example, a local 
transportation researcher noted that during peak time, 
 
Main underground and bus stations are full of sharing bikes passing or parking… People 
feel unsafe and unable to walk; even buses cannot approach stations. In 
popular attractions, bikes park everywhere disorderly… or occupy all parking spaces 
previously for citizens’ private bikes.  
 
Thus, other modes of mobility (such as bus or pedestrian) have been rendered less mobile 
because they can no longer move easily and safely. The creation of a frictionless cycling 
mobility has created friction and more immobility in other modes of transportation and their 
users. 
 
For many interviewees, the crisis of PBSS 2.0 – in the absence of any state regulation – relates 
to the failure of the market in managing the oversupply or misuse of public bikes, as one local 
transportation scholar lamented: 
 
[PBSS 2.0] use streets, sidewalks to over-distribute their bikes and run their own 
business… What is the difference between them and the street vendors who occupy 
 
12 https://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20170411/how-the-chinese-navigate-urban-sprawl/dual/ 
 
 
sidewalk to sell barbecue…? You can complain about vendors… bBut why do you have 
to tolerate and even thank [PBSS 2.0]?  
 
PBSS 2.0 as a dispositive emerges from the gray areas, disconnections and distances between 
existing bureaucratic divisions that renders it ungovernable within the remit of different 
authorities. This lack of territorialisation, distance and disconnection manifested within local 
government as an unwillingness to act due to no clear responsibility to do so. Although in late 
2017, the SMPG’s committee of transportation was asked to lead the governance of PBSS, it 
became difficult to coordinate because of different authorities’ administrative concerns and 
political interests. For example, a senior official of committee abdicated responsibility by 
stating a lack of expertise: ‘the management of sharing bike relates to lots of the management 
of public spaces and planning, but we are not experts…’. Nonetheless, another planning official 
present in the meeting confided that, ‘our leader never thinks this is our problem…’, since the 
fixed and physical developments remain more important. Precisely 
because local authorities escape from the responsibilities of delivering national policies of 
green mobility or sharing economy, they become unwilling to provide normative 
and holistic governance.  
 
Combined with previous state failures in relation to the governance of PBSS 1.0, a strong 
narrative emerged to support a privately-led and neoliberalist governance of PBSS 2.0 in which 
the privatized “forms of political-economic governance premised on the extension of market 
relationships” can maintain the dynamic development of PBSS2.0 (Larner, 2000, p. 5; Spinney 
& Lin, 2018). Numerous interviewees noted that there was a perception that state-led regulation 
would only ‘suffocate’ the innovation and ‘healthy’ market of PBSS 2.0. Clearly the diffuse 
and loosely coherent dispositive of PBSS2.0 results in what McLaren’s and Agyeman’s (2015) 
call, shifting or redefining “the boundary between public and private” through sharing 
 
 
consumption. This has caused, as Rose (1999) and Jessop (2003) illustrate, a confused 
accountability and tension of governing within/beyond the state and related failure of state or 
market. Indeed, deliberation in governing PBSS 2.0 is underpinned by a problematic dualism 
between the state and the market that ignores the complicated nature of a more horizontal 
dispositive with distantly remotely interconnected heterogeneous elements. 
 
However, from early 2017, both public and private providers were under pressure to regulate 
and govern the chaos of PBSS 2.0. By August 2017 the Shanghai municipal government called 
a halt to any new bikes appearing on the streets and drafted a set of regulations for the operation 
of PBSS 2.0. The Draft of “Regulations on the Internet Bike Rental Management of Shanghai 
Municipality”, gave city districts powers to ask firms to reduce the numbers of bikes, manage 
their parking, or cease operations altogether. This state-led intervention was targeted at 
disciplining PBSS operators who responded by having operatives organize bikes on the street, 
and creating preferred parking zones. However there emerged a new hierarchy as operators 
sought to discipline overly-mobile subjects through the smartphone app.  
 
Whilst there was always the possibility since launch that leading PBSS2.0 providers could use 
their credit system, data, and index of users collected through the APP to develop self-
governance and self-responsibility, this function was brought to bear on users much more 
forcefully in 2017. For example, the CEO of Mobike sought to implement a ‘carrot and stick’ 
credit system in which users’ good or bad behaviors can earn or lose them credits13 . By 
combining the credit system with the big data that Mobike can gather from its APP and GPS, 
PBSS 2.0 thus begins to exercise a digitalized environmentality that, for example, seeks to 
encourage citizens to report uncivilized behaviours by other users, and report lost or broken 
 
13 http://sh.people.com.cn/BIG5/n2/2016/0830/c134768-28915612.html 
 
 
bikes through GPS and online reporting. This digital environmentality aims to make citizens 
more responsible for the ‘civilization’ of cycling, and make their “activities become extensions 
and expressions of informationalized and efficient material–political practices” (Gabrys, 2014, 
p. 41). It refers to shaping, as Datta (2018, p. 132) concluded, “‘hashtag citizenships’ – the 
production of idealized urban citizens through a range of interactive apps, infographics…”. 
Such environmentality seeks to exercise the responsibilisation of individuals through practices 
of self-monitoring and citizen surveillance. As such it represents a further shift within the 
dispositive from a horizontal to vertical relationship between users, operators and the state as 
downward pressure is applied; and a corresponding set of relations between users that shifts 
from reciprocity or anonymity to surveillance. These relations remain distant and mediated 
through ICTs to a large degree.  
 
However, from our interviews and observation, these modes of self-governance exist mainly 
in theory, and fail to comprehensively govern mobile subjects to perform a more regulated and 
‘healthy’ landscape of green mobility. One key reason for this failure refers to the dominant 
rationality of market competition between PBSS 2.0 enterprises and similar mobility (such as 
E-bikes). As a local planning official said in interview: ‘If Mobike’s management is too strict, 
and then everyone can just use [other PBSS]… If there is no common rule, and then they can 
only apply the law of the jungle.’ This reference to the ‘survival of the fittest’ means the more 
widely used and popular brand will survive, which given the market conditions, was deemed 
more important than developing workable governance and regulated environmentality. Such a 
viewpoint fails to focus on the public interests, (unequal) right to the city and mobility, and 
socio-cultural meaning of cycling for citizens’ everyday life that are core to the ‘Publicness’ of 
PBSS. In order to remain competitive and not unduly affect the flexibility of the PBSS2.0 
offering, both private and public sector actors attempt to transfer the major responsibilities and 
failures of the ungovernable situation on to users and their communities through ‘nudging’ 
 
 
(Whitehead et al 2015). Many interviewees noted that the relative failure of these initiatives 
was not due to its voluntary, distanced and uneven nature, but rather that citizens were 
inuncapable of being civilized: ‘If people’s degree of civilization can improve, all social 
operations can be much better…’. Such accusations underplay the ways in which the mobile 
conduct of subjects emerges through their emplacement and interconnectednesss within the 
new dispositive. 
 
We argue that a binary deliberation between the state-led and privately-led governance of PBSS 
2.0 fails to understand and respond to the contingent dispositive of PBSS 2.0 that as Agamben 
(2009) and Gailing (2016) illustrate, involves a much more complicated interaction and 
dynamic network between heterogeneous socio-political elements, subjects and objects than 
simplified market behaviors or state-led re-regulation. Certainly it is clear that the 
smartphonised PBSS creates an unfixed and hybrid mobility, and dynamic and irregular flow 
of mobile subjects that not only changes the connections and distances between people, but 
also reshapes the forces and connections between places, authorities and different vehicles 
(Bærenholdt, 2013; De Souza e Silva, 2006). Without fostering a more inclusive or 
collaborative governance to deliberate the digitalized ‘governmobility’ of new flexible 
connections between diverse mobile subjects and objects, it is unclear what kind of collective 
rationality or socio-political consensus can be produced.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In this paper we have shown how a shift from PBSS 1.0 to 2.0 in the context of Shanghai 
reformulates governance relations and represents the emergence of a dispositive driven by the 
effects of new forms of mobility. In particular we have been concerned to foreground two 
related processes. The first is the reformulation of the governmental dispositive that coalesces 
 
 
around PBSS in Shanghai. We have shown how the relations within the dispositive shift from 
more hierarchical, bounded, regulated and state-led to relations characterised by a more 
dispersed, disconnected, horizontal and distant form. Secondly, we have shown how this 
dispositive both produces and is produced by an emergent environmentality (Gabrys 2014) that 
manifests in a fixed territorially in PBSS1.0 and a more fluid and deterritorialised digital 
environmentality in PBSS2.0. 
 
Importantly we draw attention to the importance of the intersections between virtual and 
physical mobility in reshaping environmentality and dispositive. As De Souza e Silva ( 2006) 
has theorized, the place-engaged feature of hybridized mobility has blurred the boundary and 
segmentation between the digital and physical spaces. Our case study offers an illustration of 
this as PBSS 2.0 architectures of extraction build new connections and correlation between the 
sharing economy and green mobility in the form of ‘place-engaged’ smartphonized network 
and location-free PBSS 2.0. By way of conclusion we want to draw out some of the key insights 
in relation to the ways in which social relations between different actors are reshaped in this 
process.  
 
Firstly we argue that the relationship between state and private operators is reformulated with 
the development of PBSS2.0. Whilst the nature of this relationship within PBSS1.0 was one 
characterized by state power, in PBSS2.0 this relationship becomes flatter as private operators 
cease to be subject to either local territorial concerns or the legal requirements of central 
government. However it is clear that the emergent ‘unruly’ environmentality of PBSS2.0 
pushes back upon the dispositive in the form of pressure to create more governable mobile 
subjects. The result is a form of loosely hierarchical relations where the State encourages 
private operators to act. As such private PBSS2.0 operators rather than the local state become 
the loosely disciplined executors of State power.  
 
 
 
Secondly, we highlight the shifting relations between state and citizens. In the context of 
PBSS1.0 we described a pastoral relationship where bike sharing became a territorialized (if 
unsuccessful) tool to articulate and legitimate the relations between the local state and citizens. 
Here central state power is devolved to the local. However, in PBSS2.0 we see the local state 
largely removed from the dispositive as planning functions and any pastoral relationship are 
removed from the dispositive in favour of a locative logic premised upon emergent 
use. Thus the relation between state (both local and central) and citizens is all but severed. Even 
in the process of attempting to ‘civilise’ PBSS2.0, the local state is backgrounded and planning 
authorities try to distance themselves. 
 
Thirdly, there is a reshaping of relations between private operators and citizens. In PBSS1.0 
private companies manifest as depoliticized servants of the state, their role defined as one of 
delivering infrastructure. In PBSS2.0 a new set of private operators become a more direct 
service provider, even though this relationship is mediated through the smartphone. In the final 
reported phase of PBSS2.0 the private operators become executors of state power and capital 
accumulation as they attempt to discipline users in the search for profitability and ongoing state 
legitimation. Again, this relationship is deterritorialised and conducted through the digital 
environmentality of the smartphone.  
 
Finally within the dispositive and through the emerging digital environmentality there is a 
reorientation of citizens with each other. In PBSS1.0, the relations between citizens are 
characterized by anonymity, physical presence and reciprocity mediated through fixed 
PBSS1.0 infrastructure. In PBSS2.0 citizens become oriented toward each other as they are 
encouraged through the PBSS app to conduct surveillance on other users. This suggests a less 
reciprocal and more distant relationship mediated through a digital environmentality. 
 
 
 
Clearly there are profound implications for urban governance because of the ways in which 
intersecting mobilities reshape governance as a more contingent, uncertain and ongoing 
accomplishment (Baerenholdt 2013; Braun 2014). Certainly it is no longer possible to separate 
the physical and virtual (Sheller & Urry 2006) when trying to understand the internal dynamics 
and external manifestations of governance which in our example are characterized by more 
fluid, more voluntary, less localised, flatter, and physically distant relationships.  
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